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Abstract
Mean field game theory studies the behavior of a large number of interacting individuals
in a game theoretic setting and has received a lot of attention in the past decade [27]. In
this work, we derive mean field game partial differential equation systems from deterministic
microscopic agent dynamics. The dynamics are given by a particular class of ordinary differ-
ential equations, for which an optimal strategy can be computed [10]. We use the concept of
Nash equilibria and apply the dynamic programming principle to derive the mean field limit
equations and we study the scaling behavior of the system as the number of agents tends to
infinity and find several mean field game limits. Especially we avoid in our derivation the
notion of measure derivatives. Novel scales are motivated by an example of an agent-based
financial market model.
1 Introduction
A great variety of phenomena in social and natural sciences is described and analyzed by
agent-based models [18, 5, 6]. In many situations, the number of interacting agents is large
and the agents compete against each other, e.g. by maximizing their individual payoff [3]. We
assume that the agents’ dynamics can be modeled by differential games [31, 2, 19]. Models of
this type can be found in many areas of research such as biology, engineering and economics.
Mean field game theory considers an infinite number of players that are in a Nash equilibria
[31, 19]. In the last decade, there has been a vast number of contributions, since the indepen-
dent introduction of mean field Nash equilibria by Lasry and Lions and Huang, Caines and
Melhame´ [27, 19, 25, 22, 14, 13, 12, 26, 28, 21, 20, 8, 1, 15, 16].
Mathematically speaking, a mean field game model is characterized by as system of two cou-
pled partial differential equations (PDEs) called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann (HJB) equations.
The first PDE (1a) is posed backwards in time and associated to the optimal control problem.
The second PDE (1b) is forward transport equation in time.
The prototype deterministic mean field game (MFG) model of the literature [11, 17] is given
by:
∂th(t, x)−H(x, g(t, x),∇xh(t, x)) = 0, (1a)
∂tg(t, x)− div(∇3H(x, g(t, x),∇xh(t, x)) g(t, x)) = 0, (1b)
g(0, x) = g0, h(x, T ) = p(x, g(T, x)), (1c)
with t ∈ (0, T ), x ∈ Rd and Hamiltonian H = H(x, g(t, x),∇xh(t, x)). Here, ∇3H denotes
the derivative with respect to the third component of the Hamiltonian. The function h de-
scribes the value function of a player at time t and attribute x, whereas g is a probability
density function characterizing the probability of finding an agent at time t with attribute
x. Many results are analytical results such as existence and uniqueness [7, 27, 11, 15]. The
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derivation of MFG systems from microscopic dynamics has been shown only by Lions [11] to
our knowledge and more recently by Degond et al. [17]. Recently, the solvability and mean
field limit of linear-quadratic differential games has been investigated [23, 30, 24].
In this work, we consider a particular class of microscopic differential games [10] and study
different mean field limits, obtained by different scaling assumptions. Starting with disrete
microsocpic dynamics, we solve the closed loop problem (feedback Nash equilibria) by the
dynamic programming principle. Then, we consider the mean field limit and the continuum
limit. This approach enables us to avoid the measure derivatives as presented in [11, 17].
Another strategy in order to connect the microscopic dynamics with the mean field game
model is presented in [12]. The authors first prove the well-posedness of the mean field game
equations. As second step they evaluate the PDE along trajectories of the empirical measure
in order to connect the limit equation with particle dynamics.
We especially want to point out that several MFG models discussed in literature belong
to our model [11, 19, 17, 23, 30, 24]. A particular example is the econophysical Levy-Levy-
Solomon (LLS) model [29], which does not lead to a MFG limit system of type (1). This
model is discussed in section 4.
2 Background and Main Results
Microscopic Differential Game Model We consider N players, each player i =
1, ..., N is faced with the constrained optimization problem
argmax
ui: [0,T ]→R
pi(x(T ))−
T∫
0
Li(t,x,u) dt, (2)
with time horizon T > 0 where x = (x1, ..., xN)
⊤ ∈ RdN , xi = (x
1
i , ..., x
d
i )
⊤ ∈ Rd, 1 ≤ i ≤
N, d ≥ 1 is the state solution to (3) and u = (u1, ..., uN )
⊤ ∈ RN is the control, x and u are
time dependent.
x˙ = f(t,x,u), x(0) = x0 ∈ R
dN
. (3)
The functions f = (f1, ..., fN )
⊤, L = (L1, ..., LN )
⊤, p = (p1, ..., pN)
⊤ are continuously
differentiable and defined on:
fi : [0, T ]× R
dN × RN → Rd, Li : [0, T ]× R
dN × RN → R, pi : R
dN → R.
Nash Equilibria We assume that the players can observe the current state x of the
system, thus their strategies may depend on time, the current state and the initial state ui =
u∗i (t,x(t);x0). Hence, the agents play a feedback or Markovian strategy. This equilibrium
concept is known as feedback Nash equilibrium. For our further discussion we neglect the
dependence of u on the trajectory x and the initial state x0.
Definition 1. A vector of control functions u∗ : (t) 7→ (u∗1(t), ..., u
∗
N (t))
⊤ is a Nash equi-
librium for the game (2) if the following holds. The control u∗i (t) provides a solution to the
optimal control problem for player i, where we assume that the control of the other agents
u∗−i(t) := (u
∗
1(t), ..., u
∗
i−1(t), u
∗
i+1(t), ..., u
∗
N (t))
⊤ ∈ RN−1 are fixed and optimal:
argmax
ui:[0,T ]→R
pi(x(T ))−
⊤∫
0
Li(t,x, ui,u
∗
−i) dt, (4a)
s.t. x˙ = f (t,x,u), x(0) = x0. (4b)
Assumption 1. We assume that the dynamics and the running costs decouple in the following
way:
f (t,x,u) = f0(t,x) +M1(t,x) u1(t,x) + ...+M
N (t,x) uN (t,x), (5a)
Li(t,x,u) = L
1
i (t,x, u1) + ...+ L
N
i (t,x, uN ), (5b)
2
with u(t,x) = (u1(t,x), ..., uN (t,x))
⊤ ∈ RN ,f0(t,x) ∈ RdN , M i(t,x) ∈ RdN , i = 1, ..., N .
For this class of differential games, one can prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium solutions [10]. The following proposition gives detailed conditions on the existence
and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium solutions, see Bressan [10].
Proposition 1. [Lemma 2 in [10]] We consider the microscopic model (5) and assume that
M i depends continuously on (t,x). For every (t,x) ∈ [0, T ] × RdN and any vector λi ∈
R
dN , i = 1, ..., N , there exist a unique vector u∗ ∈ RN , respectively a map: (t,x,λ) 7→
u∗(t,x,λ), such that the control value u∗i fulfills
u
∗
i = argmax
ω∈R
(λi)⊤M i(t,x) ω − Lii(t,x, ω).
Here, λi denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the optimality system (4). In order to compute
the control explicitly, we restrict ourselves to the following class of running costs L.
Assumption 2. We consider running costs of the form
L
i
i(t,x,u) =
1
N
li(t,x) +
α̂
2
u
2
i , (6a)
L
k
i (t,x,u) =
1
N
li(t,x) +
α¯
2
u
2
k, k 6= i. (6b)
with α̂ > 0, α¯ ≥ 0 and li : [0, T ]× R
dN → R, continuous differentiable in (t,x).
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2 the optimal control value u∗i is given by
u
∗
i =
1
α̂
(λi)⊤ M i(t,x).
In the further discussion we summarize the main steps and key assumptions needed to
derive the MFG limit system.
Symmetry Assumptions A crucial assumption is to consider identical, indistinguish-
able players. This translates into symmetry assumptions on our running costs L and dynamics
f .
Definition 2. We define an empirical moment ρNΦ (x) ∈ R, x ∈ R
dN of the polynomial of
degree n
Φ(x) =
∑
|j|≤n
βj (x
1)j1(x2)j2 ...(xd)jd , βj ∈ R x = (x
1
, ..., x
d)⊤ ∈ Rd,
with multi-index notation |j| = j1 + j2 + ...+ jd, by
ρ
N
Φ (x) :=
1
N
N∑
k=1
Φ(xk).
Notice that the empirical moment ρNΦ is symmetric with respect to the N variables
xk. Here, symmetry ρ
N
Φ (x) = ρ
N
Φ (xσ) is defined by any permutation σ : {1, ..., N} →
{1, ..., N}, xσ := (xσ1 , ..., xσN ).
Assumption 3. We model the dynamic f and running cost L for some t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈
R
dN , ρNΦ (x) ∈ R as follows.
i) f0i (t,x) := f(t, xi, ρ
N
Φ (x)) with f : [0, T ]× R
d × R→ Rd, i = 1, ..., N .
ii) M ii(t,x) := m̂(t, xi, ρ
N
Φ (x)), M
i
k(t,x) := m¯(t, xk, ρ
N
Φ (x)), k 6= i, k = 1, ..., N with
m̂ : [0, T ]× Rd × R → Rd, m¯ : [0, T ]× Rd × R→ Rd.
iii) li(t,x) := l(t, xi, ρ
N
Φ (x)) with l : [0, T ]× R
d × R→ R.
iv) pi(x) := p(xi, ρ
N
Φ (x)) with p : R
d × R→ R.
Furthermore, we assume that the functions f, m̂, m¯, l, p are
• continuously differentiable in all arguments,
• Lipschitz continuous with respect to (x, ρNΦ ) and with Lipschitz constant independent of
t.
Notice that all quantities denoted with a hat denote the self-interaction of agents, whereas
the quantities with a bar denote the interaction with other agents. Furthermore, we want to
emphasize that the functions f, m̂, m¯, l, p are symmetric in x−i := (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xN)
⊤ ∈
R
d(N−1).
3
Scaling Assumptions The mean field limit will be derived for different scalings of
m̂, m¯, α̂, α¯. In order to obtain in the limit N →∞ a mean field game equation the quantities
m¯ and α¯ need to be scaled in the following way:
Assumption 4. For a¯, θ¯ ≥ 1 we define
m¯ :=
1
N θ¯
m¯, α¯ :=
1
N a¯
α¯.
For θ̂, â ≥ 0 we define
m̂ :=
1
N θ̂
m̂, α̂ :=
1
N â
α̂.
The previous assumption will be explained in detail in section 3. The main result is as
follows, see Lemma 3. If the inequalities
i) η1 := â− 2 θ̂ ≤ 0,
ii) η2 := â+ 1− θ̂ − θ¯ ≤ 0,
iii) η3 := 2 â+ 1− 2 θ̂ − a¯ ≤ 0,
hold under Assumptions 1-4 a formal mean field limit of the differential game (2)-(3) exists.
Eight different limiting equations are obtained depending if the inequalities i)− iii) are sharp
or not. In the case that the inequalities i) − iii) are sharp we call this vanishing-coupling
since all game-theoretic components vanish in the mean field limit. The case of equality in
i) and inequality in ii) and iii) corresponds to the case in literature e.g. [17, 11]. For that
reason we call this setting the classical-coupling. In the case that we have equality in ii)
or iii) we obtain non-local integral terms in our limit equations. Therefore, we refer to this
setting as non-local-coupling.
Main Result The formal MFG limit under different scalings is given by (7):
∂th(t, x) + f(t, x, ρΦ[g]) ∇xh(t, x) (7a)
+
(
χ{η
2
=0}
[
1
α̂
m¯(t, x, ρΦ[g])
∫
g(t, z) m̂(t, z, ρΦ[g]) ∇zh(t, z) dz
])
∇xh(t, x) (7b)
= l(t, x, ρΦ[g])− χ{η
1
=0}
[
1
2α̂
(m̂(t, x, ρΦ[g]) ∇xh(t, x))
2
]
(7c)
+ χ{η
3
=0}
[
α¯
2 α̂2
∫
g(t, z) (∇zh(t, z) m̂(t, z, ρΦ[g]))
2
dz
]
, (7d)
∂tg(t, x) + divx
((
f(t, x, ρΦ[g]) + χ{η
1
=0}
[
1
α̂
(m̂(t, x, ρΦ[g]))
2 ∇xh(t, x)
]
(7e)
+ χ{η
2
=0}
[
1
α̂
m¯(t, x, ρΦ[g]))
∫
g(t, z) ∇zh(t, z) m̂(t, z, ρΦ[g]) dz
] )
g(t, x)
)
= 0, (7f)
g(0, x) = g0(x), h(T, x) = p(x, ρΦ[g](T )). (7g)
Here, χ denotes the indicator function and
ρΦ[g] = ρΦ[g](t) =
∫
Rd
Φ(y) g(t, y) dy,
the moment. In the case of the classical coupling χ{η
2
=0} = χ{η
3
=0} = 0 holds. For the
vanishing-coupling χ{η
1
=0} = χ{η
2
=0} = χ{η
3
=0} = 0 holds. The terms multiplied by χ{η
1
=0}
represent the self-interaction of each player with the field of other players. Whereas the terms
multiplied by χ{η
2
=0} are the interactions of each player with the field of players. Finally, the
quantity multiplied by χ{η
3
=0} appears when the control costs of each agent depends on the
field of optimal controls of the other agents.
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3 Main Result
We use dynamic programming principle to solve the closed loop problem [4, 9]. The value
function Vi(τ, y), τ ∈ [0, T ], y ∈ R
dN is defined as:
Vi(τ,y) := pi(x
∗(T ))−
⊤∫
τ
Li(t,x
∗(t),u∗(t),x∗(t)) dt,
where x∗i (t) = x
∗
i (t, τ,y) denotes the optimal solution and the vector y ∈ R
dN is the initial
condition of our equation (3) at time τ : x(τ ) = y. Consequently, the value function Vi is the
total payoff for the i-th player at time τ with initial condition y.
Lemma 2. For a small time step ∆τ the discrete dynamic programming principle applied to
the differential game (2)-(3) for i = 1, ..., N is given by:
Vi(τ,y) =−∆τ
(
l(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) +
α̂
2
(u∗i (τ ))
2 +
α¯
2
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(u∗k(τ ))
2
)
(8a)
+ Vi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )) +O(∆τ
2), (8b)
u
∗
i (τ ) =
1
α̂
m̂(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) ∇xiVi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )) (8c)
+
1
α̂
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
m¯(τ, xk(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ )))∇xkVi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )) +O(∆τ
2). (8d)

xi(τ +∆τ ) = yi +∆τ
[
f(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) + m̂(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) u
∗
i (τ )
+m¯(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (τ ))
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
u∗k(τ )
]
+O(∆t2),
xi(τ ) = yi.
(9)
Proof. For any time step ∆τ > 0 by the dynamic programming principle
Vi(τ,y) = max
ui:[τ,τ+∆τ ]→R
−
τ+∆τ∫
τ
Li(t,x, ui,u
∗
−i) dt+ Vi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )), (10)
holds. As ∆τ shrinks to zero the choice of the unknown reduces to the choice of u∗i (τ )
Vi(τ,y) = max
ui(τ)∈R
−∆τ
l(τ, xi(τ ), ρNΦ (x(τ ))) + α̂2 (ui(τ ))2 + α¯2
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(u∗k(τ ))
2
 (11a)
+ Vi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )) +O(∆τ
2). (11b)
The first order approximation of our state dynamics on τ ≤ t ≤ τ +∆τ are given by:
xi(τ +∆τ ) = yi +∆τ
(
f(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) + m̂(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) ui(τ ) (12a)
+ m¯(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ )))
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
u
∗
k(τ )
)
+O(∆t2). (12b)
We solve the optimization problem on (τ, τ +∆t) and obtain by the necessary condition the
value u∗i (τ )
u
∗
i := u
∗
i (τ ) =
1
α̂
m̂(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) ∇xiVi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )) (13a)
+
1
α̂
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
m¯(τ, xk(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ )))∇xkVi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )) +O(∆τ
2).
(13b)
5
Averaged Bellmann Principle In this section, we reduce the large system (8) of N
value functions Vi to an averaged value function 〈W 〉N . The goal is to show the value function
Vi only depends on yi and on all the other variables y−i := (y1, ..., yi−1, yi+1, ..., yN )
⊤ ∈
R
(N−1) d only through the empirical moment ρN−1Φ,i := ρ
N−1
Φ (x−i) =
1
N−1
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
Φ(xk). The
value function W then only depends on yi and the empirical moment ρ
N−1
Φ,i . Without any
rescaling it is in general not possible to identify Vi by a value function W since the system
(8) as well as the state dynamics (12b) depend on xj , j 6= i not only by empirical moments.
In fact, we introduce a mean field scaling such that a dependence of the value function W is
only on ρNΦ,i.
Definition 3. Assume that Assumption 3 is satisfied for a fixed but arbitrary function Φ(·).
Then, we define the averaged Bellman system depending on two scaling parameter a¯, θ¯ ≥ 1.
We call a C2 function W : [τ, τ +∆τ ]× Rd × R → R a solution to the HJB system if for all
yi ∈ R
d and ρN−1Φ,i ∈ R equations (14) hold.
〈
W (τ, yi, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )
〉
N
= −∆τ
〈(
l(τ, yi, ρ
N
Φ ) +
α̂
2
(p∗i (τ ))
2 +
α¯
N a¯ 2
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(p∗k(τ ))
2
)
(14a)
+W
(
τ +∆τ, vi(τ +∆τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ )
)〉
N
, (14b)

vi(τ +∆τ ) = yi +∆τ
[
f(τ, yi, ρ
N
Φ ) + m̂(τ, yi, ρ
N
Φ ) p
∗
i (τ )
+ 1
N θ¯
m¯(τ, yi, ρ
N
Φ )
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
p∗k(τ )
]
,
vi(τ ) = yi, i = 1, ..., N,
(14c)
p
∗
i :=
1
α̂
m̂(τ, vi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ ) ∇viW (τ +∆τ, vi(τ +∆t), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ )). (14d)
Here, we use ρN−1Φ,i (τ+∆τ ) as short hand notation for ρ
N−1
Φ (v−i(τ+∆τ )) and 〈·〉N denote
the averaging with respect to all agents: 〈·〉N :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(·). The function W (τ, yi, ρ
N−1
Φ,i ) is not
symmetric in yi but the empirical moment ρ
N−1
Φ,i is symmetric with respect to the variables
y−i := (y1, ..., yi−1, yi+1, ..., yN)
⊤ ∈ Rd(N−1). As next step we connect W with the value
function of the i−th agent.
Corollary 1. Assume that a unique C2 solution 〈W 〉N of (14) with respect to the second
and third component exists. Additionally we assume that W¯ : [τ, τ +∆τ ]× Rd × R → R is a
unique C2 solution in the sense of Definition 3 of the system (15a)-(17)
〈W¯ (τ, yi, ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i )〉N =−∆τ
〈(
l(τ, yi, ρ¯
N
Φ,i) +
α̂
2
(u¯∗i (τ ))
2 +
1
N a¯
α¯
2
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(u¯∗k(τ ))
2
)〉
N
(15a)
+ 〈W¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))〉N , (15b)

x¯i(τ +∆τ ) = yi +∆τ
[
f(τ, yi, ρ¯
N
Φ,i) + m̂(τ, yi, ρ¯
N
Φ,i) u¯
∗
i (τ )
+ 1
N θ¯
m¯(τ, yi, ρ¯
N
Φ,i)
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
u¯∗k(τ )
]
,
x¯i(τ ) = yi.
(16)
6
with
u¯
∗
i (τ ) :=
1
α̂
m̂(τ, yi, ρ¯
N
Φ,i) ∇x¯iW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ )) (17a)
+
1
α̂
1
N θ¯
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
m¯(τ, yk, ρ¯
N
Φ,i) ∂3W¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))
∇xkΦ(xk)
N
.
(17b)
Furthermore, we assume
|W¯ (τ +∆τ, z, ρ)−W (τ +∆τ, z˜, ρ˜)| ≤
C
N θ¯
(|z − z˜|+ |ρ− ρ˜|), ∀ρ, ρ˜ ∈ R, z, z˜ ∈ Rd,∣∣∣∇zW¯ (τ +∆τ, z, ρ)−∇zW (τ +∆τ, z˜, ρ˜)∣∣∣ ≤ C
N θ¯
(|z − z˜|+ |ρ− ρ˜|), ∀ρ, ρ˜ ∈ R, z, z˜ ∈ Rd,
|Φ(z)− Φ(z˜)| ≤ C|z − z˜|, ∀z, z˜ ∈ Rd,
|m̂(t, z, ρ)| ≤ C, |m¯(t, z, ρ)| ≤ C, |∇Φ(z)| ≤ C, ∀ t ∈ [τ, τ +∆τ ], ρ ∈ R, z ∈ Rd.
Then the following inequalities
|〈W¯ (τ, yi, ρ)−W (τ, yi, ρ)〉N | ≤
C
N θ¯
, ∀ ρ ∈ R,
|〈∇yiW¯ (τ, yi, ρ)−∇yiW (τ, yi, ρ)〉N | ≤
C
N θ¯
, ∀ ρ ∈ R,
|〈x¯i(τ +∆τ )− vi(τ +∆τ )〉N | ≤
C
N θ¯
,
hold.
Proof. For simplicity we only consider the i-th value function and do not consider the average,
〈·〉N . First, we note that
∂3W¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i, ρ
N−1
Φ (x¯−i))
∇x¯kΦ(x¯k)
N
= ∇x¯kW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i, ρ
N−1
Φ (x¯−i)),
for k 6= i holds. Thus, we conclude that
|∇x¯kW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ (x¯−i(τ +∆τ )))| ≤
C
N
,
holds since |∇Φ(x¯k)| < C and |∂3W¯ | < C by assumption. Consequently
∣∣∣ 1
α̂
1
N θ¯
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
m¯(τ, yk, ρ¯
N
Φ,i)∇x¯kW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ (x¯−i(τ +∆τ )))
∣∣∣ ≤ C
N θ¯
,
holds as well. Therefore, we obtain:∣∣∣u¯∗i (τ )− 1
α̂
m̂(τ, yi, ρ¯
N
Φ,i) ∇x¯iW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))
∣∣∣ ≤ C
N θ¯
.
Hence, the following inequality
|u¯∗i (τ )− p
∗
i (τ )| ≤
C
N θ¯
+C
∣∣∣∇x¯iW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯N−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))
−∇viW (τ +∆τ, vi(τ +∆τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆t))
∣∣∣
Ass
≤
C
N θ¯
+
C
N θ¯
|x¯i(τ +∆τ )− vi(τ +∆τ )|
+
C
N θ¯
|Φ
(
x¯k(τ +∆τ )
)
− Φ
(
vk(τ +∆τ )
)
|
≤
C
N θ¯
+
C
N θ¯
|x¯i(τ +∆τ )− vi(τ +∆τ )|,
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is fulfilled. Then it immediately follows that
|x¯i(τ +∆t)− vi(τ +∆t)| ≤ |f(τ, y, ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i )− f(τ, y, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )|+ C |u
∗
i (τ )− p
∗
i (τ )|
+
C
N θ¯
N |u∗k(τ )− p
∗
k(τ )|
Sym
≤ 0 +
(
C +
C
N θ¯
N
)(
C
N θ¯
+
C
N θ¯
|x¯i(τ +∆t)− vi(τ +∆t)|
)
≤
C
N θ¯
+
C
N θ¯
|x¯i(τ +∆t)− vi(τ +∆t)|,
holds and we get:
|x¯i(τ +∆t)− vi(τ +∆t)| ≤
C
N θ¯
(
1−
C
N θ¯
)−1
=
C
N θ¯ −C
≤
C
N θ¯
,
for N sufficiently large. As next step we use the assumption
|W¯ (τ +∆τ, z¯, ρ¯)−W (τ +∆τ, z, ρ)| ≤
C
N θ¯
(|z¯ − z|+ |ρ¯− ρ|),
to obtain the following estimate:
|W¯ (τ, yi, ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i )−W (τ, yi, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )|
≤ |W¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))−W (τ +∆τ, vi(τ +∆τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))|
+
∣∣∣∣∣ α̂2 [(u¯∗i (τ ))2 − (p∗i (τ ))2] + α¯2 1N a¯
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(u¯∗k(τ ))
2 − (p∗k(τ ))
2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
C
N θ¯
∣∣∣(|x¯i(τ +∆τ )− vi(τ +∆τ )|+ |ρ¯N−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ )− ρN−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ )|)
+
( α̂
2
+
α¯
2
N
N a¯
)∣∣∣(u¯∗i (τ ))2 − (p∗i (τ ))2∣∣∣
≤
C
N θ¯
(
C
N θ¯
+
C
N θ¯
)
+
(
α̂
2
+
α¯
2
N
N a¯
)∣∣∣( 1
α̂
m̂(τ, yi, ρ¯
N
Φ,i) ∇x¯iW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ )))
2
− (
1
α̂
m̂(τ, yi, ρ
N
Φ,i) ∇viW (τ +∆τ, vi(τ +∆t), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ )))
2
∣∣∣
+
( α̂
2
+
α¯
2
N
N a¯
)∣∣∣C2
α̂2
N
N θ¯
∇x¯kW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ (x¯−i(τ +∆τ )))
∇x¯iW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))
∣∣∣
+
(
α̂
2
+
α¯
2
N
N a¯
)
C2
α̂2
N2
N2 θ¯
∣∣∣(∇x¯kW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρN−1Φ (x¯−i(τ +∆τ ))))2∣∣∣
≤
C
N θ¯
+
( α̂
2
+
α¯
2
N
N a¯
)C
α̂
∣∣∣∇x¯iW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯N−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))
−∇viW (τ +∆τ, vi(τ +∆t), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∇x¯iW¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯N−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ )) +∇viW (τ +∆τ, vi(τ +∆τ ), ρN−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))∣∣∣
+
(
α̂
2
+
α¯
2
N
N a¯
)(
C2
α̂2
N
N θ¯
C2
N
+
C2
α̂2
N2
N2 θ¯
C2
N2
)
≤
C
N θ¯
.
It remains to show that the gradient satisfies the same growth conditions. Therefore we apply
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a Taylor approximation of zeroth order and get:∣∣∣∇y(W¯ (τ, y, ρ¯N−1Φ,i )−W (τ, y, ρN−1Φ,i ))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∇2(W¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯N−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))−W (τ +∆τ, x¯i(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯N−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ )))(
y − x¯i(τ +∆τ )
)
+ ∂3
(
W¯ (τ +∆τ, x¯(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯N−1Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))−W (τ +∆τ, x¯(τ +∆τ ), ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ ))
)
(
ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ )− ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ )
)∣∣∣
≤
C
N θ¯
∆τ +
C
N θ¯
|Φ(yk)−Φ(xk(τ +∆τ ))| ≤
C
N θ¯
.
Remark 1. The assumed rates for the difference of the value functions W, W¯ in Corollary
1 can be expected since the dynamics of W and W¯ only differ in the optimal control by a
quantity of order O
(
1
N θ¯
)
.
As next step we are ready to bound the error between the function 〈W 〉N of (14) and the
averaged value functions 〈Vi〉N of (8).
Corollary 2. Assume that unique solutions Vi, i = 1, ..., N in the sense of Definition 3 of
the system
〈Vi(τ, y)〉N =−∆τ
〈(
l(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) +
α̂
2
(u∗i (τ ))
2 +
α¯
2 N a¯
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(u∗k(τ ))
2
)〉
N
(18a)
+ 〈Vi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ ))〉N , (18b)
u
∗
i (τ ) =
1
α̂
m̂(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) ∇xiVi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )) (18c)
+
1
α̂ N θ¯
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
m¯(τ, xk(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ )))∇xkVi(τ +∆τ,x(τ +∆τ )). (18d)

xi(τ +∆τ ) = yi +∆τ
[
f(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) + m̂(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (x(τ ))) u
∗
i (τ )
+ 1
N θ¯
m¯(τ, xi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (τ ))
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
u∗k(τ )
]
,
xi(τ ) = yi.
(19)
exist. Additionally, we assume that the assumptions of Corollary 1 are satisfied. Then the
following inequalities
|〈Vi(τ,y)−W (τ, yi, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )〉N | ≤
C
N θ¯
,
|〈∇yiVi(τ, y)−∇yiW (τ, yi, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )〉N | ≤
C
N θ¯
,
|〈xi(τ +∆τ )− vi(τ +∆τ )〉N | ≤
C
N θ¯
,
hold.
Proof. Thanks to the introduced scaling in (18)- (19) any solution 〈W¯ (τ, yi, ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i )〉N can be
identified by the function 〈Vi〉N . We define
〈Vi(τ,y)〉N := 〈W¯ (τ, yi, ρ¯
N−1
Φ )〉N ,
9
and immediately obtain that
〈∇yiVi(τ,y)〉N = 〈∇yiW¯ (τ, yi, ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i )〉N ,
〈∇ykVi(τ,y)〉N = 〈∇ykW¯ (τ, yi, ρ¯
N−1
Φ (y−i))〉N =
〈
∂3W¯ (τ, yi, ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i )
∇ykΦ(yk)
N
〉
N
, k 6= i
holds. This identification is only possible because of the new scaling of the system (8). For
the difference between 〈Vi〉N and 〈W 〉N we get:
|〈Vi(τ,y)−W (τ, y, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )〉N | ≤|〈W¯ (τ, y, ρ¯
N−1
Φ,i )−W (τ, y, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )〉N | ≤
C
N θ¯
.
Similarly, we obtain the following estimate for the state dynamics:
|xi(τ +∆τ )− vi(τ +∆τ )| = |x¯i(τ +∆τ )− vi(τ +∆τ )| ≤
C
N θ¯
.
For the gradient we are able to obtain the same estimate:
|〈∇yiVi(τ, y)−∇yiW (τ, yi, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )〉N | ≤
C
N θ¯
.
Notice that the value system (18) considers the functions m¯, α¯ and not the functions m¯
and α¯ of the original system (8).
Remark 2. In the case α¯ > 1 the quantity
α¯
2 N a¯
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(p∗k(τ ))
2 → 0,
of equation (14a) vanishes as N →∞. Equivalently the quantity
m¯
N θ¯
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
p
∗
k(τ )→ 0,
of equation (14c) vanishes in the limit N →∞ provided that θ¯ > 1 holds.
For our further discussion we consider the system (14) and study the example α¯ = θ¯ = 1.
For other scalings the computations work in a similar way. Results are given in section 3.1.
Since
W (τ +∆τ, vi(τ +∆t), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ +∆τ )) =W (τ, vi(τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ )) +O(∆τ ),
holds the state dynamics for arbitrary initial condition xi(τ ) are given by
zi(τ +∆τ ) = yi +∆τ
[
f(t, zi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ )) (20a)
+ m̂(t, zi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ ))
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ )) ∇ziW (t, zi(τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ ))
)
(20b)
+ m¯(t, zi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ ))
1
N
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zk(τ ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ )) ∇zkW (t, zk(τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ,i (τ )))
]
,
(20c)
zi(τ ) = xi(τ ). (20d)
Thus, (20) can be seen as an explicit Euler discretization of the corresponding time continuous
dynamics. In comparison to the state dynamics (14c) we get
zi(τ +∆τ ) = vi(τ +∆τ ) +O((∆τ )
2),
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provided that xi(τ ) = y holds. Thus, we can rewrite the discrete dynamics of the value
function as〈
W (τ, zi(τ),ρ
N
Φ,i(τ))
〉
N
= −∆τ
〈(
l(τ, zi(τ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ)) (21a)
+
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zi(τ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ)) ∇ziW (τ, zi(τ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ))
)2
(21b)
+
α¯
2
1
N
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zk(τ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ)) ∇zkW (τ, zk(τ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ))
)2)
(21c)
+W (τ +∆τ, zi(τ +∆τ), ρ
N
Φ,i(τ +∆τ))
〉
N
. (21d)
which is accurate up to O((∆τ )2) in comparison to (14a). Finally, we are ready to discuss
the mean field limit.
Mean Field Limit
Definition 4. Given a vector x := (x1(, ..., xN )
⊤ ∈ RdN , xi := (x
1
i , ..., x
d
i ) ∈ R
d, i = 1, ..., N
the empirical measure µNx is defined by
µ
N
x (x
1
, ..., x
d) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(x1 − x1i ) · ... · δ(x
d − xdi ).
We have for Φ as in Definition 2 and the empirical measure µNx
ρ
N
Φ (x) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
Φ(xk) =
∫
Φ(x1, ..., xd) dµNx (x
1
, ..., x
d) =: ρΦ[µ
N
x ]
The computation shows that the empirical moment depends on the empirical measure µNx .
We apply this to functions f, m̂, m¯, l, q, due to assumption 3. Exemplarily, we obtain for f
f(τ, x, ρNΦ (x)) = f
(
τ, x, ρΦ[µ
N
x ]
)
.
In the same manner, we rewrite the solution 〈W 〉N .
〈W (τ, xi, ρ
N−1
Φ,i )〉N = 〈W
(
τ, xi, ρΦ[µ
N−1
x
−i
]
)
〉N . (22)
If W is Lipschitz with respect to ρN−1Φ,i and since
||ρNΦ − ρ
N−1
Φ,i ||L1(RdN ) =
Φ(xi)
N
,
holds, we have: ∣∣∣〈W (τ, xi, ρNΦ )−W (τ, xi, ρN−1Φ,i )〉N ∣∣∣ ≤ CN .
Therefore, we replace in the dynamics (20)W (τ, zi(τ ), ρ
N−1
Φ (z−i(τ ))) byW (τ, zi(τ ), ρ
N
Φ (z(τ ))).
Then the time continuous limit of (20) reads
z˙i(t) = f(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t)) (23a)
+ m̂(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t))
(
1
α̂
m̂(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t)) ∇ziW (t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t))
)
(23b)
+ m¯(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t))
1
N
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
1
α̂
m̂(t, zk(t), ρ
N
Φ (t)) ∇zkW (t, zk(t), ρ
N
Φ (t)), (23c)
zi(τ ) = xi(τ ), (23d)
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on τ ≤ t ≤ τ + ∆τ for arbitrary initial conditions xi(τ ). The corresponding discretized
dynamic of the value function becomes〈
W (τ, zi(τ),ρ
N
Φ (τ))
〉
N
= −∆τ
〈(
l(τ, zi(τ), ρ
N
Φ (τ)) (24a)
+
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zi, ρ
N
Φ (τ)) ∇ziW (τ, zi(τ), ρ
N
Φ (τ))
)2
(24b)
+
α¯
2
1
N
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zk, ρ
N
Φ (τ)) ∇zkW (τ, zk(τ), ρ
N
Φ (τ))
)2)
(24c)
+W (τ +∆τ, zi(τ +∆τ), ρ
N
Φ (τ +∆τ))
〉
N
. (24d)
We introduce the function h : [0, T ]× Rd → R defined by
h(τ, zi(τ )) :=W (τ, zi(τ ), ρΦ[µ
N
z ](τ )),
for the empirical measure µNz (τ ) on R
d.
Transport Equation Let φ(z), z ∈ Rd be a test function.
d
dt
∫
R
φ(z) dµNz (t, z) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∇zφ(z)
(
f(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t))
+ m̂(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t))
(
1
α̂
m̂(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t)) ∇zih(t, zi(t))
)
+ m¯(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t))
1
N
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
1
α̂
m̂(t, zk(t), ρ
N
Φ ) ∇zkh(t, zk(t))
)
(25)
=
∫
R
∇zφ(z)
(
f(t, z, ρNΦ (t)) + m̂(t, z, ρ
N
Φ (t))
(
1
α̂
m̂(t, z, ρNΦ (t)) ∇zh(t, z)
)
+ m¯(t, z, ρNΦ (t))
∫
R
1
α̂
m̂(t, z′, ρNΦ (t)) ∇z′h(t, z
′) dµNz (t, z
′)
−
1
N
m¯(t, z, ρNΦ (t))
∫
R
1
α̂
m̂(t, z˜, ρNΦ (t)) ∇z′h(t, z˜) dµ
1
zi
)
dµ
N
z (t, z)
Here, we have used that
1
N
N∑
k=1
1
α̂
m̂(t, zk(t), ρ
N
Φ (t)) ∇zkh(t, zk(t)) (25a)
−
1
N
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
1
α̂
m̂(t, zk(t), ρ
N
Φ (t)) ∇zkh(t, zk(t)) (25b)
=
1
N
1
α̂
m̂(t, zi(t), ρ
N
Φ (t)) ∇zih(t, zi(t)), (25c)
HJB Equation In the following we derive the corresponding HJB equation of equation
(21). As before we employ the empirical measure to rewrite averages as integrals. Thus, we
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obtain: ∫
Rd
h(τ, z˜) dµNz (τ, z˜)−
∫
Rd
h(τ +∆τ, z˜) dµNz (τ +∆τ, z˜) (26a)
(27)
= −∆τ
∫
Rd
l(τ, z˜, ρNΦ (τ)) +
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z˜, ρNΦ (τ)) ∇zh(τ, z˜)
)2
dµNz (τ, z˜) (26b)
−∆τ
α¯
2
∫
Rd
∫
Rd
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ (τ)) ∇z′h(τ, z
′)
)2
dµNz (τ, z
′) dµNz (τ, z˜) (26c)
+ ∆τ
1
N
α¯
2
∫
Rd
∫
Rd
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ (τ)) ∇z′h(τ, z
′)
)2
dµ1zi dµ
N
z (τ, z˜). (26d)
Here, we have additionally used:
α¯
2
1
N
N∑
k=1
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zk, ρ
N
Φ (τ )) ∇zkh(τ, zk(τ ))
)2
(27a)
−
α¯
2
1
N
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zk, ρ
N
Φ (τ )) ∇zkh(τ, zk(τ ))
)2
(27b)
=
1
N
α¯
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, zi, ρ
N
Φ (τ )) ∇zih(τ, zi(τ ))
)2
(27c)
As next step we divide by −∆τ and consider the limit ∆τ → 0. Thus, we formally obtain a
temporal derivative on the left hand side of (26).∫
Rd
d
dτ
h(τ, z˜) dµNz (τ, z˜) = (28a)
∫
Rd
(
l(τ, z˜, ρNΦ (τ)) +
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z˜, ρNΦ (τ)) ∇z˜h(τ, z˜)
)2
(28b)
+
α¯
2
∫
Rd
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ (τ)) ∇z′h(τ, z
′)
)2
dµNz (τ, z
′)
)
dµNz (τ, z˜) (28c)
−
1
N
α¯
2
∫
Rd
∫
Rd
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ (τ)) ∇z′h(τ, z
′)
)2
dµ1zi dµ
N
z (τ, z˜). (28d)
Note that the following inequalities∣∣∣ 1
N
∫
R
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, µNz (τ)) ∇z′W (τ, z
′, ρNΦ [µ
N
z ](τ))
)2
dµ1zi
∣∣∣ ≤ C
N
,
∣∣∣ 1
N
∫
R
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, µNz (τ)) ∇z′W (τ, z
′, ρNΦ [µ
N
z ](τ)) dµ
1
zi
∣∣∣ ≤ C
N
,
hold, since
|∇z′(τ, z
′
, ρ
N
Φ [µ
N
z ](τ ))| ≤ C
for all τ > 0, z′ ∈ Rd, ρNΦ ∈ R. Thus, both terms are of order O(
1
N
) and we can neglect them
in the limit. Thus, the HJB and transport equation are given up to order O( 1
N
) by:
d
dt
∫
R
φ(z) dµNz (t, z) = (29a)
∫
R
∇zφ(z)
(
f(t, z, ρNΦ (t)) + m̂(t, z, ρ
N
Φ (t))
(
1
α̂
m̂(t, z, ρNΦ (t)) ∇zh(t, z)
)
(29b)
+ m¯(t, z, ρNΦ (t))
∫
R
1
α̂
m̂(t, z′, ρNΦ (t)) ∇z′h(t, z
′) dµNz (t, z
′)
)
dµ
N
z (t, z). (29c)
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Thus, equation (29) is the weak form of the following transport equation:
∂tµ
N
z (t, z) + divz
[(
f(t, z, ρNΦ (t)) + m̂(t, z, ρ
N
Φ (t))
(
1
α̂
m̂(t, z, ρNΦ (t)) ∇zh(t, z)
)
(30a)
+ m¯(t, z, ρNΦ (t))
∫
R
1
α̂
m̂(t, z′, ρNΦ (t)) ∇z′h(t, z
′) µNz (t, z
′)dz′
)
µ
N
z (t, z)
]
= 0. (30b)
Equivalently, the HJB equation (28) up to order O( 1
N
) reads
d
dτ
∫
Rd
h(τ, z˜) dµNz (τ, z˜) =
∫
Rd
(
l(τ, z˜, ρNΦ (τ)) +
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z˜, ρNΦ (τ)) ∇z˜h(τ, z˜)
)2
(31a)
+
α¯
2
∫
Rd
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ (τ)) ∇z′h(τ, z
′)
)2
dµNz (τ, z
′)
)
dµNz (τ, z˜). (31b)
This is equivalent to∫
R
∂τh(τ, z) dµ
N
z (τ ) +
∫
R
h(τ, z) ∂τdµ
N
z (τ, z)
=
∫
R
(
l(τ, z, ρNΦ ) +
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z, ρNΦ ) ∇zh(τ, z)
)2
+
α¯
2
∫
R
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ ) ∇z′h(τ, z
′))
)2
dµ
N
z (t, z
′)
)
dµ
N
z (τ, z).
Then we use the transport equation (30) and get∫
R
∂τh(τ, z) dµ
N
z (τ, z)−
∫
R
h(τ, z) divz
([
f(τ, z, ρNΦ ) +
1
α̂
(m̂(τ, z, ρNΦ ))
2 ∇zh(τ, z)
+
1
α̂
m¯(τ, z, ρNΦ )
∫
∇z′h(τ, z
′) m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ ) dµ
N
x (τ, z
′)
]
µ
N
z (τ, z)
)
dz
=
∫
R
(
l(τ, z, ρNΦ ) +
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z, ρNΦ ) ∇zh(τ, z)
)2
+
α¯
2
∫
R
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ ) ∇z′h(τ, z
′))
)2
dµ
N
z (t, z
′)
)
dµ
N
z (τ, z).
Integration by parts gives then the final HJB equation∫
R
(
∂τh(τ, z) +∇zh(τ, z)
[
f(τ, z, ρNΦ ) +
1
α̂
(m̂(τ, z, ρNΦ ))
2 ∇zh(τ, z)
+
1
α̂
m¯(τ, z, g)
∫
∇z′h(τ, z
′) m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ ) dµ
N
z (τ, z
′)
])
dµ
N
z (τ, z)
=
∫
R
(
l(τ, z, ρNΦ ) +
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z, ρNΦ ) ∇zh(τ, z)
)2
+
α¯
2
∫
R
(
1
α̂
m̂(τ, z′, ρNΦ ) ∇z′h(τ, z
′))
)2
dµ
N
z (t, z
′)
)
dµ
N
z (τ, z).
tested against the empirical measure µNz ≥ 0.
We assume that in the limit N → ∞ the empirical measure µNz converges to a measure
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with probability distribution function g : [0, T ] × Rd → R. Thus, the mean field game limit
equations are given on the support of g and for all t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rd by:
∂th(t, x) +∇xh(t, x)
(
f(t, x, ρΦ[g]) +
1
α̂
m¯(t, x, ρΦ[g])
∫
g(t, z) m̂(t, z, ρΦ[g]) ∇zh(t, z) dz
)
= l(t, x, ρΦ[g])−
1
2 α̂
[
∇xh(t, x) m̂(t, x, ρΦ[g])
]2
+
α¯
2 α̂2
∫
g(t, z)
(
∇zh(t, z) m̂(t, z, ρΦ[g])
)2
dz,
∂tg(t, x) + divx
([
f(t, x, g) +
1
α̂
(m̂(t, x, ρΦ[g]))
2 ∇xh(t, x)
+
1
α̂
m¯(t, x, ρΦ[g]
∫
g(t, z) ∇zh(t, z) m̂(t, z, ρΦ[g]) dz
]
g(t, x)
)
= 0,
g(0, x) = g0, h(T, x) = p(x, ρΦ[g](T )).
Here, we have replaced the dependence on the empirical moment ρNΦ by the corresponding
moment of the probability distribution function g given by ρΦ[g](t) :=
∫
Φ(x) g(t, x) dx. The
previous MFG limit system corresponds to the choice of the non-local-coupling. The limit
equations of the other couplings are easily obtained by different scalings with respect to the
number of agents.
3.1 Scalings for m̂ and α̂
In the previous section we have seen that the scaling of the quantities α¯ and m¯ have to satisfy
α¯ ∼ O
(
1
N a¯
)
, a¯ ≥ 1 m¯ ∼ O
(
1
N θ¯
)
, θ¯ ≥ 1.
This choice was necessary in order to obtain a closed equation for W . Therefore, we aim to
investigate alternative scalings for the functions m̂ and weight α̂. We assume the following
scaling of value function W
∇yiW
(
t, yi, ρ
N−1
Φ (y−i)
)
∼ O(1). (32)
For the derivative with respect to a symmetric variable j, j 6= i we get:
∇yjW
(
t, yi, ρ
N−1
Φ (y−i)
)
∼ O
(
1
N
)
. (33)
Lemma 3. We assume that
α¯ ∼ O(
1
N a¯
), α¯ ≥ 1 m¯ ∼ O(
1
N θ¯
), θ¯ ≥ 1, f ∼ O(1), l ∼ O(1), p ∼ O(1)
and equations (32),(33) hold. We rescale the quantities m̂ and α̂ with respect to the number
of agents N ; we consider
m̂ :=
1
N θ̂
m̂, α̂ :=
1
N â
α̂,
for θ̂, â ≥ 0. Then the set of all possible scalings are an interplay of the scaling parameters
θ̂, θ¯, â, a¯ defined by the following inequalities.
i) â− 2 θ̂ ≤ 0,
ii) â+ 1− θ̂ − θ¯ ≤ 0,
iii) 2 â+ 1− 2 θ̂ − a¯ ≤ 0.
Proof. First, we analyze the scales of the quantities f i and Li in the system (14). By assump-
tion f ∼ O(1), p ∼ O(1) and l ∼ O(1) holds. Thus, the remaining sums of f i asymptotically
satisfy:
i) m̂
(
1
α̂
m̂ ∇xiW (xi, ρ
N−1
Φ (x−i))
)
∼
m̂
2
α̂
O(1),
ii)
1
N θ¯
m¯
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
1
α̂
m̂ ∇xkW (xk, ρ
N−1
Φ (x−k)) ∼
m̂
α̂
O
(
N
N θ¯
)
.
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Respectively, the remaining terms of Li satisfy:
iii)
1
N a¯
α¯
2
N∑
k=1, k 6=i
(
1
α̂
m̂ ∇xkW (xk,x−k)
)2
∼ O
( N
N a¯
)
m̂
2
α̂
2
,
iv)
α̂
2
(
1
α̂
m̂ ∇xiW (xi, ρ
N−1
Φ (x−i))
)2
∼
m̂
2
α̂
O(1).
The scales i) and iv) are asymptotically identical. Hence, the relevant quantities read:
i)
m̂
2
α̂
O(1) ∼ O
(
N â
N2θ̂
)
, â− 2 θ̂ ≤ 0,
ii)
m̂
α̂
O
(
N
N θ¯
)
∼ O
(
N â+1
N θ̂+θ¯
)
, â+ 1− θ̂ − θ¯ ≤ 0,
iii)
m̂
2
α̂
2
O
( N
N a¯
)
∼ O
(N2 â+1
N2 θ¯+a¯
)
, 2 â+ 1− 2 θ¯ − a¯ ≤ 0.
The inequalities i)−iii) then define the precise form of the mean field game limit equations
stated previously (7).
Remark 3. The scaling considered in the previous section in order to derive the mean field
limit is given by:
a¯ = θ¯ = 1, â = θ̂ = 0.
Clearly, for this choice we have equality in the quantities i) − iii).
4 Financial Market Model
In this section, we give an explicit example of a non-local-coupling which has been in-
troduced in [33]. Inspired by the econophysical Levy-Levy-Solomon model [29], we consider
N financial agents. Each agent is equipped with two portfolios, one portfolio represents the
investment in a risky stock, the other the investment in safe bonds. The sum of the risky
investments x ∈ R≥0 and the risk-free investments y ∈ R≥0 is the overall wealth of the i-th
agent wi := xi + yi, i = 1, ..., N . The system reads:
x˙i = κ
S˙ +D
S
xi + u
∗
i , (34a)
y˙i = r yi − u
∗
i , (34b)
S := λ
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk, (34c)
u
∗
i = argmax
ui∈R
−
T∫
t
l(s, xi, ρ
N
Φ (x), yi, ρ
N
Φ (y)) +
α̂
2
u
2
i ds. (34d)
Here, x := (x1, ..., xN)
⊤ ∈ RN and r,D > 0, λ, κ ∈ (0, 1) are positive constants. We denote
by S ∈ R≥0 the stock price where D symbolizes a dividend. Furthermore, is r the interest rate
of the safe asset, λ the market depth and κ expresses transaction costs. The agents can shift
their money between both portfolios by the optimal control u∗i , a positive control corresponds
to a shift of the money from the bond portfolio to the stock portfolio. We assume quadratic
costs and the objective function l is not specified, but is only allowed to depend on t, xi, yi
and some empirical moment ρNΦ .
Before we can derive the limit system, we need an explicit ODE for the risky portfolio. We
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define e := (1, ..., 1)⊤ ∈ RN , I := diag(1) ∈ RN×N and rewrite our risky asset equation:
x˙ = diag(κ)
λ
N
e⊤x˙+D
λ
N
e⊤x
x+ u
(
I − diag(κ)
x e⊤
e⊤x︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P (x)
)
x˙ = diag κ
D
λ
N
e⊤x
x+ u
The matrix P is a rank one matrix and ||P ||1 = κ < 0 holds. Hence, the inverse of Σ(x) :=
I − P (x) exists and has a Neumann series expansion. We get:
Σ−1(x) =
N∑
k=0
P
k(x) = I +
N∑
k=0
α
k
P (x) = I +
1
1− α
P (x), α := trace(P (x)) = κ.
Thus, the explicit stock ODE is given by:
x˙ =
D
λ
N
e⊤x
Σ−1(x) diag(κ) x+ Σ−1(x) u.
For the i-th agent we observe:
x˙i =
(
c1 + c2
1
N
N∑
k=1
u
∗
k
) xi
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk
+ u∗i ,
y˙i = r yi − u
∗
i ,
u
∗
i = argmax
ui∈R
−
T∫
t
l(s, xi, ρ
N
Φ (x), yi, ρ
N
Φ (y)) +
α̂
2
u
2
i ds,
where the constants c1, c2 are defined by: c1 := (1 +
κ
1−κ
) κ D
λ
, c2 :=
κ
1−κ
. We consider an
arbitrary model for l, which satisfies the symmetry assumption 3. This model fits into the
previously introduced framework.
Lemma 4. We verify the symmetry assumptions and scaling properties of the microscopic
system (34).
f(xi, ρ
N(x), yi) =
(
c1
xi
ρN (x)
, r yi
)⊤
∼ O(1), ρN(x) :=
1
N
N∑
k=1
xk,
M
i
i = m̂ =
(
c2
xi
ρN(x)
1
N
+ 1,−1
)⊤
∼ O(1),
M
i
k,k 6=i = m¯ =
(
c2
xi
ρN(x)
1
N
, 0
)⊤
∼ O
(
1
N
)
,
α¯ ≡ 0, p ≡ 0 k, i = 1, ..., N.
Then we deduce the limiting system for N →∞:
∂th(t, x, y) + ∂xh(t, x, y)
(
c1
x∫
z1 g(t, z1, z2) dz1dz2
(35a)
+
c2 x
α̂
∫
z1 g(t, z1, z2) dz1dz2
∫
g(t, z1, z2) (∂z1h(t, z1, z2)− ∂z2h(t, z1, z2)) dz1dz2
)
(35b)
+ ∂yh(t, x, y) r y = l(t, x, y, g)−
1
2α̂
(∂xh(t, x, y)− ∂yh(t, x, y))
2, (35c)
∂tg(t, x, y) + ∂x
([
c1
x∫
z1 g(t, z1, z2) dz1dz2
+
1
α̂
(∂xh(t, x, y) − ∂yh(t, x, y)) (35d)
+
c2 x
α̂
∫
z1 g(t, z1, z2) dydx
∫
g(t, z1, z2) (∂z1h(t, z1, z2)− ∂z2h(t, z1, z2)) dz1 dz2
]
g(t, x, y)
)
(35e)
+ ∂y
([
r y +
1
α̂
(∂yh(t, x, y)− ∂xh(t, x, y))
]
g(t, x, y)
)
= 0. (35f)
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Simplified Model We simplify the previous model by considering only the risky portfolio.
This is realistic if the prime rate of a national bank is zero. We set y ≡ 0 in equation (35)
and assume that h = h(t, x) holds. Then the limit system is given by:
∂th(t, x) + ∂xh(t, x)
(
c1
x∫
z g(t, z) dz
+
c2
α̂
x∫
z g(t, z) dz
∫
g(t, z) ∂zh(t, z) dz
)
= l(t, x, g)−
1
2α̂
(∂xh(t, x))
2
,
∂tg(t, x) + ∂x
([
c1
x∫
z g(t, z) dz
+
1
α̂
∂xh(t, x)
+
c2
α̂
x∫
z g(t, z) dz
∫
g(t, z) ∂zh(t, z) dz]
]
g(t, x)
)
= 0.
Discussion of financial market model This microscopic financial market model is
regarded as the rational version of kinetic portfolio optimization model introduced in [34, 35].
In this context, rational means that the financial agents solve their optimization problem
exactly. The model introduced in [34, 35] considers boundedly rational agents in the sense of
Simon [32]. Mathematically, the investors simplify their optimization problem using model
predictive control. The authors prove that the model can generate well known features of
financial markets such as booms and crashes and fat-tails in asset returns. In economic
research, there is an ongoing discussion if these phenomena, called stylized facts have their
origin in the irrational behavior of market participants. A detailed analysis of the introduced
rational portfolio model might help to answer this question. The discussion of this highly
non-linear model is left open for further research.
5 Conclusion
We derived the MFG limit system of microscopic dynamics and shown that it is possible to
apply MFG theory to an important class of microscopic differential games. In addition, we
have seen that the symmetry and the scaling behavior of the microscopic model is crucial
in order to obtain the limit. It is possible to derive different MFG models of the discussed
setting. Finally, we have shown that financial market models are a prototype candidate for
MFG applications. Furthermore, this example motivates the discovery of novel scalings, we
have conducted in this study.
Extensions are the generalization of the microscopic differential game model. Such a new
setting might include an infinite horizon optimization or stochastic state dynamics. Although
all results of this study are formal, we believe that this work shows the great applicability
of MFG theory to a large class of microscopic systems. We hope that this work clarifies the
derivation of complex MFG models and furthermore enables the reader to apply MFG theory
to a broad area of applications.
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